Abstract. In this paper we introduce the notion of certificateless proxy re-encryption and also give precise definitions for secure certificateless proxy re-encryption schemes. We present a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing, which enjoys the advantages of certificateless public key cryptography while providing the functionalities of proxy re-encryption. Moreover, the proposed scheme is unidirectional and compatible with current certificateless encryption deployments. Finally, we show that our scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model.
Introduction
In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, a semi-trusted proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into a new ciphertext under Bob's public key on the same message. However, the proxy cannot learn any information about the messages encrypted under the public key of either Alice or Bob. PRE has received plenty of attention from the research community as fundamental cryptographic function to solve key management problems in various practical applications such as distributed file systems, secure email forwarding, and interoperable DRM systems in recent years [3, 4, 10] .
In [7] , Blaze et al. introduced the notion of PRE and proposed a concrete PRE scheme, where the message and secret keys are kept hidden from the proxy. However, their scheme is bidirectional. That is, the information released to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob can also be used to transform ciphertexts in the opposite direction [3, 10] . Note that, it is obvious that unidirectional PRE is more powerful than bidirectional one since any unidirectional scheme can be easily transformed to a bidirectional one. Moreover, their scheme suffers from collusion attack that Alice (Bob) can collude with the proxy to reveal Bob's (Alice's) secret key. Ateniese et al. [3] presented the first constructions of unidirectional proxy re-encryption based on bilinear pairing. The schemes prevent the proxy from colluding with Bob to expose Alice's secret key. However, their schemes only achieve chosen plaintext attack (CPA) security.
As pointed out in [10] , chosen plaintext security is clearly not enough for many applications that require security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). Canetti and Hohenberger [10] addressed the problem of obtaining a PRE scheme that is secure against chosen ciphertext attack. They then provided a formal security model for secure PRE schemes and presented a construction that has chosen ciphertext security in the standard model. However, their construction is still bidirectional and vulnerable to collusion attack like previous bidirectional PRE schemes. Recently, Libert and Vergnaud [15] presented the first construction of unidirectional proxy re-encryption that has chosen ciphertext security in the standard model. In [13] , Green and Ateniese addressed the problem of identity-based PRE and presented a unidirectional scheme that has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model [6] . However, the scheme suffers from the collusion attack owing to the key sharing technique employed in the scheme. That is, Bob can collude with the proxy to reveal Alice's secret key.
Even though a number of PRE schemes have been proposed in the literature, all prior PRE schemes are constructed based on either traditional public key encryption (PKE) [3, 7, 10, 15, 16] or identity-based encryption (IBE) [13] . However, it is well recognized that traditional PKE suffers from the issues associated with certificate management such as revocation and IBE has inherent key escrow problem. To alleviate the aforementioned problems in traditional PKE and IBE, the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), which combines the best aspects of traditional PKE (i.e., key escrow free) and of IBE (i.e., implicit certification), was introduced in [1] . The topic of CL-PKC has undergone quite rapid development with many schemes being proposed for encryption, signature, authenticated key agreement, and so on.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we introduce the notion of certificateless proxy re-encryption that enjoys the best aspects of traditional PKE and of IBE while providing the functionalities of proxy re-encryption. Upon taking into consideration of both security notions of certificateless encryption and proxy re-encryption, we provide a formal security model for constructing secure certificateless proxy re-encryption schemes and present a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing. The proposed scheme is unidirectional and compatible with existing certificateless encryption deployments. Finally, we show that our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives precise definition and security model for certificateless proxy re-encryption schemes. In Section 3, we present the first construction of certificateless proxy re-encryption based on bilinear pairing and then prove that the proposed scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model under reasonable complexity assumption. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4.
In this section, we present a definition of a certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) scheme and provide a formal security model so as to construct secure CL-PRE schemes.
Definition
We incorporate certificateless encryption (CLE) [1, 2] into proxy re-encryption (PRE) [10, 13] for constructing a new certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme. A model for certificateless proxy re-encryption is specified as follows: For completeness, it is obviously required that the following two propositions must hold for any message m in the message space M:
where sk ID ← Set-Private-Key(params,d ID ,x ID ) and rk A→B ← Set-ProxyRe-Encryption-Key(params,ID A ,pk A ,sk A ,ID B ,pk B ).
Security Model
Here we provide a security model to prove the adaptive chosen ciphertext security of our CL-PRE scheme. To give a precise security notion for the proposed scheme, we take into account both security notions of certificateless encryption [1, 2] and proxy re-encryption [10, 16] . Following the security model in [1, 2] , there are two kinds of adversaries, named Type I and Type II adversaries, that represent a malicious third party and an honest-but-curious key generation center (KGC) in our security model, respectively. In addition, we consider the notion of derivative ciphertexts [10, 16] to prevent the adversaries from breaking our CL-PRE scheme by means of re-encryption queries and re-encryption key queries corresponding to the challenge identity ID * and the challenge ciphertext C * . We then define two different types of "indistinguishability of encryptions under chosen ciphertext attack" (IND-CCA) games against the Type I and the Type II adversaries, respectively. The first game between the Type I adversary (denoted by A I ) and the challenger is defined as follows:
The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the resulting public parameters params to A I and keeps the master key mk to itself. running algorithm Set-Proxy-Re-Encryption-Key to generate the re-encryption key rk i→j . -Re-Encryption query on (ID i ,ID j ,C IDi ). The challenger responds by running algorithm Re-Encrypt to transform the ciphertext C ID i into the re-encrypted ciphertext C ID j using the re-encryption key rk i→j . -Decryption query on (ID i ,C ID i ). The challenger responds by running algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext C ID i using the private key sk IDi . Even though the public key for ID i may be replaced, the challenger is forced to respond with a correct answer as in [1, 2] . Challenge: Once A I decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and an identity ID * of uncorrupted private key, on which it wishes to be challenged. In particular, ID * may not have been submitted to both Replace Public Key and Extraction queries. Moreover, A I is restricted to the choice of ID * such that trivial decryption is not possible using keys extracted in Phase 1, e.g., by using re-encryption keys to transform C ID * into C ID i for which A I holds a decryption key. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext C * = Encrypt(m b ,params,ID * ,pk ID * ), where pk ID * is the public key currently associated with ID * . It sends C * as the challenge to A I . Phase 2: A I issues more queries q m+1 , . . . , q n adaptively where q i is one of:
is not a challenge derivative, the challenger responds as in Phase 1. The definition of challenge derivative is as follows [10, 16] :
Key query on (ID i ,ID j ) to obtain a re-encryption key rk i→j , and We define the advantage of A I in breaking the CL-PRE scheme as
Definition 2. We say that a unidirectional CL-PRE scheme is (t, )-adaptive chosen ciphertext (IND-CCA) secure against the Type I adversary if for any ttime adversary A I we have that Adv(A I ) < .
We now define the second game between the Type II adversary (denoted by A II ) and the challenger as follows:
The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the resulting public parameters params and the master key mk to A II . In this section, we present the first construction of CL-PRE based on bilinear pairing, which gets rid of key escrow problem inherent in identity-based PRE schemes as well as the certificate revocation problem in traditional public key based PRE ones. We apply the transformation technique of Libert and Quisquater [14] , which is a modification of Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [12] by hashing the recipient's identity and public key along with the message and the random string in the encryption algorithm, to our construction. As pointed out in [14] , Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion is not enough to prevent an attacker from breaking the scheme by using public key replacement oracles in the certificateless setting. We then prove that the proposed scheme is secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) in the random oracle model.
Bilinear Pairing and Complexity Assumption
We start by providing a brief overview of bilinear pairing and related computational problems on which our CL-PRE scheme is based. We use the following standard notation [8, 9] to describe bilinear pairing: 
The security of our scheme relies on the intractability of the following problem [8] . The p-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion (p-BDHI) problem is defined as follows: given a tuple (g, g α , . . . , g
An algorithm B has advantage in solving the p-BDHI problem if
Where the probability is over the random choice of generator g ∈ G 1 , the random choice of α ∈ Z * q , and the random bits of B.
Definition 4. We say that the (t, p, )-BDHI assumption holds in G 1 if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least in solving the p-BDHI problem in G 1 .
Construction
The detailed description of the scheme is as follows:
Setup: Given security parameters k and k 0 , this algorithm performs as follows:
1. Choose a k-bit prime number q, bilinear map groups (G 1 , G 2 ) of order q, and random generators g, h ∈ G 1 . 2. Pick a KGC's master secret key α ∈ Z * q uniformly at random and compute a public key g 1 
q as a private key.
Set-Public-Key: This algorithm takes params and user A's secret value x A as inputs, and produces user A's public key pk A = (g
Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ M using the identifier ID A and the public key pk A = (g
, the sender performs the following steps:
where
Set-Proxy-Re-Encryption-Key: Given user B's identifier ID B and public key pk B = (g
3. Set the proxy re-encryption key rk A→B = (rk (1) A→B , rk (2) A→B , rk
Re-Encrypt: Given a re-encryption key rk A→B and a ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) under the identifier ID A and the public key pk A , the proxy performs the following steps:
Decrypt:
-To decrypt non re-encrypted ciphertext C, the receiver A performs as follows:
, return m as the message. Otherwise, output ⊥.
-To decrypt re-encrypted ciphertext C , the receiver B performs as follows: The consistency of the construction is easy to check as follows:
-For the receiver A, we have
r -For the receiver B, we have
Security Analysis
We prove the security of our CL-PRE scheme under the p-BDHI assumption described in Section 3.1. To prove the theorem, the proof separately considers both kinds of adversaries to establish the chosen ciphertext security of the above CL-PRE scheme. We now prove Theorem 1 by combining the following two lemmas. 
The proof of Lemma 1 is found in Appendix A. 
The proof of Lemma 2 will be found in the full version of the paper due to the space limitation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of certificateless proxy re-encryption and also provided precise definitions for constructing secure certificateless proxy re-encryption schemes. We have presented a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing, which enjoys the advantages of certificateless public key cryptography while providing the functionalities of proxy re-encryption. The proposed scheme is unidirectional and compatible with existing certificateless encryption deployments.
Proof. Let A I be an adversary which has advantage in attacking the IND-CCA security of our CL-PRE scheme. We show how to build an algorithm B that uses A I to solve the p-BDHI problem in G 1 . Given as input a random tuple
, B's goal is to extract e(g, g) 1/α for some unknown α. As in [1, 14] , we start by distinguishing two kinds of Type I adversaries:
-Type I-A adversary : may replace the public key for the challenge identity ID * as some point, but cannot ask for the corresponding partial private key. -Type I-B adversary : may ask for the partial private key of the challenge identity ID * at some point, but cannot replace the corresponding public key.
Therefore, since B should guess which kind of Type I adversary will be, it chooses a random bit c ∈ {0, 1}. Setup: To generate public parameters params, B does the followings: -Case c = 0. B builds a generator h ∈ G 1 for which it knows p − 1 pairs of the form (ψ i , h 1/(ψ i +β) ) for random i = . This work is done as follows:
Compute the public key of the KGC as g 1 
for unknown master key mk := β = −α − ψ ∈ Z * q , and set v = g α as another generator.
Then, it chooses a random β ∈ Z * q as the KGC's master key and computes the corresponding public key g 1 
Without issuing a H 2 -query on the input (e(h, h) r ||e (h, v) x ,1 ·r ), A I is unable to recognize that C * is not an encryption of m 0 or m 1 and such an event would provide B with the searched p-BDHI solution.
-Case c = 1. B picks a random l ∈ Z * q and a random string ξ ∈ {0, 1} n+k0 . B then defines the challenged ciphertext to be
where y is obtained from evaluating
). Define r = l/α. Then, we have that To produce a result, B chooses a random tuple (γ 1 ||γ 2 , ζ) from the H 2 -list with probability 1/q H 2 . We distinguish two cases according to the value of c.
2 ·l/α and B can extract the p-BDHI solution by noting that, if γ * = e(g, g) 1/α , then If B does not abort during the simulation, it is clear that the simulations of the other oracles are perfect. Now, let us calculate the probability that B does not abort during the simulation. Let ¬Abort denote this event. As the proof technique in [1, 14] , we define the following events:
-H: A I chooses ID as the challenge identity ID * . -F 0 : A I extracts the partial private key for ID at some point. -F 1 : A I replaces the public key of ID at some point.
Following the above events, B could abort for one of the following reasons:
1. Because c = 0 and the event F 0 occurs during the simulation. 2. Because c = 1 and the event F 1 occurs during the simulation. 3. Because of a private key query for the identity ID . Let F 2 denote this event. 4. Because of a re-encryption key query for (ID , ID j ). Let F 3 denote this event. 5. Because A I chooses a challenge identity ID * = ID . Let ¬H denote this event.
We also name the event (c = i) ∧ F i as H i for i = 0, 1. It is obvious that the event H implies the events ¬F 2 and ¬F 3 . Therefore, the probability that B does not abort during the simulation is 
